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Abstract: The global COVID-19 pandemic has spotlighted several instances of churches violating state
issued and scientifically recommended guidelines designed to keep populations healthy and to prevent
the further spread of the disease. While these instances are minority responses to these orders, they none-
theless raise questions about the rationality of ecclesial belonging in response to the COVID-19 pandemic.
In this article, I draw on the work of William James and W. E. B. Du Bois to articulate a conception of
ecclesial belonging as a social epistemological process engaging a complex, fluid multiplicity of knowers
of various scales. I argue that, in this view, ecclesial rationality involves the construction of a concatenation
of internal and external practices individual believers and groups can traverse so long as they consistently
satisfy a plurality of desiderata. I suggest that what is irrational about religious-based defiance of COVID-19
guidelines is the church-sanctioned severance of internal from external practices. I suggest that this
behavior is supported by a failure to grasp the demands of ecclesial rationality rather than embrace
them, and that this conception of rationality may have been eroded by the value-neutral skepticism of
secular rationality.
Keywords: William James, W. E. B. Du Bois, religious experience, phenomenology, philosophy of religion,
pragmatism, radical empiricism, rationality, ecclesial belonging
1 Introduction
On March 22, 2020, in opposition to the suggestions from the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention to
practice social distancing, Bishop Gerald Glenn of New Deliverance Evangelistic Church in Richmond,
Virginia, held a sermon in which he claimed, “I firmly believe that God is larger than this dreaded virus.”
On Sunday, April 14, 2020, Bishop Gerald Glenn died from COVID-19.¹ Unfortunately, Bishop Glenn is not
alone. In the early months of the COVID-19 pandemic, many churches defied stay-at-home orders and held
services despite warnings from federal, state, and local authorities about the dangers of mass gathering. In
Louisiana, Pastor Tony Snell held services despite a statewide ban on social gathering. Shortly thereafter, a
78-year-old man who had recently visited the church died. The coroner determined the death was due to
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COVID-19.² Several churches have followed suit, and in some denominations as many 30 pastors and
church leaders have died from the virus.³
In the polarized context of America’s political system, it is easy to interpret these misfortunes as
confirmation of the essential irrationality of organized religion in contrast to the sterling rationality of
secular institutions. Although this interpretation may easily emerge in the American political context, it
overlooks two important considerations. First, it overlooks the consideration that these defiant churches
and their leaders make up only a minority of churches and church leadership in the United States, and that
the overwhelming majority of churches complied with the stay-at-home orders and moved to online ser-
vices, many of whom continued to offer online service even after stay-at-home restrictions were rescinded.
Second, it overlooks the consideration that these forms of ecclesial defiance are not the only forms of
defiance observable during the pandemic. Many states witnessed the right to work protests that featured
even larger groups of people, many with little to no relation to religious institutions. These observations
challenge the assumption that defiance of guidelines in the COVID-19 pandemic can be attributed to the
essential irrationality of religious thinking and belonging.
However, this is not to say that these forms of defiance are not irrational. They are most definitely
expressions of irrational thought and behavior, in the case of both the individuals and the groups that
defied these orders. What I want to suggest in the case of the religious forms of defiance is that they are not
expressions of the essential irrationality of religious thought, behavior, and belonging, but that they are
failures of religious rationality and rational ecclesial belonging. To make this case, I want to propose a
conception of rational ecclesial belonging, explicate the demands of this conception, and elucidate the
ways in which these demands can fail to be satisfied. In this view, rational ecclesial belonging and rational
ecclesial operations consistently and simultaneously satisfy a plurality of evaluative desiderata at various
scales, applicable to both individual members and groups of members, and they facilitate successful
participation in the broader ecclesial context. According to this view, what is irrational about the reli-
gious-based forms of COVID-19 safety order defiance is that they fail to satisfy these desiderata and fail to
facilitate successful participation in this broader context.
To develop this case and this view of ecclesial rationality, I look to the work of William James and
W. E. B. Du Bois. I first examine the doctrine of pure experience and radical empiricism James developed
toward the end of his career. I suggest that radical empiricism is a transcendental phenomenology in
support of the pragmatism James had long been developing.⁴ I then examine the work of W. E. B. Du
Bois in The Souls of Black Folk, specifically in the tenth chapter, “Of the Faith of the Fathers.” I argue that
this chapter develops an account of religious experience and participation in the developing black church
that not only coheres with James’s radical empiricism and pragmatism, but that supports an account of
rational ecclesial belonging and operation with the features just described. I suggest that this account
construes ecclesial rationality as a satisfactory leading of both individuals and groups through a concate-
nation of internal and external practices that link the ecclesial body to the practices of the surrounding
environment. I contend that what is irrational about some forms of ecclesial operation is that they severe
ecclesial from nonecclesial practices. I argue that this view explains what is irrational about religious-based
defiance of COVID-19 guidelines and that this suggests that the contemporary forms of religious irrationality
expressed by both individuals and institutions amounts to a failure to grasp and satisfy the demands of
ecclesial rationality rather than embrace them.
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2 William James in a world of pure experience
In “Does ‘Consciousness’ Exist?” William James makes a claim that has often been noted for its substance
but seldom interrogated for its methodological presuppositions.⁵He says, “consciousness […] is the name of
a nonentity, and has no right to a place among first principles.”⁶Many philosophers have been struck by the
first part of this claim and have interpreted James as here rejecting substance dualism. While I agree James
rejects substance dualism, I am struck by the second part of this claim, the suggestion that “consciousness
[…] has no right to a place among first principles.” I find this claim particularly perplexing because I do not
take James to be a philosopher of first principles. Consider, by way of contrast, the philosophies of Kitarō
Nishida and Edmund Husserl. In An Inquiry into the Good, Kitarō Nishida begins with the notion of pure
experience,⁷ and his first chapter is replete with citations of James, including James’s essay “A World of
Pure Experience.”⁸ For Nishida, pure experience is what one must turn to “[t]o understand true reality […]
[and] discard all artificial assumptions.”⁹ Like Descartes’ cogito, pure experience is “a firm base” for proper
philosophizing.¹⁰ Similarly, Husserl construes his phenomenological or transcendental έποχή as a redux of
the Cartesian method, not “to doubt universally […][but] to parenthesize every objectivity.”¹¹ For Husserl,
this bracketing of “the natural attitude” reveals “pure consciousness” or a “phenomenological residuum”
that discloses “a new region of being never before delimited.”¹² However, for Husserl, this new region is not
just a new frontier, but a propaedeutic for all other inquiries.¹³ In this sense, both Husserl and Nishida
construct foundationalist philosophies; they both identify a starting point, or beginning place, for proper
philosophizing that attempts to shake off prior commitments. James takes a different tack. In “The
Sentiment of Rationality,” James says that “the power to trust […] is an essential function”¹⁴ and in
“Reflex Action and Theism,” James says that “the given world is there […][and that the] only possible
duty […] is the duty of getting the richest results that the material given will allow.”¹⁵ In this way, James
adopts a philosophy in mediis rebus¹⁶ or a method of taking on commitments one already has and dis-
cerning the reliable from the unreliable rather than a method of starting from scratch or from a beginning.
So what then does James mean when he says that consciousness has no right among first principles?
Has James abandoned his prior methodology? It seems not. After claiming that consciousness has no right
among first principles, James notes a continuity in his thought, claiming that “[f]or twenty years past I have
mistrusted ‘consciousness’ as an entity [and] for seven or eight years past I have suggested its non-
existence to my students.”¹⁷ In the follow-up essay, “A World of Pure Experience,” James also aligns his
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pure experience commitment to consciousness as a nonentity with his doctrine of radical empiricism.¹⁸ Of
course, radical empiricism is a distinct doctrine from James’s pragmatism, which is most definitively a
philosophy in mediis rebus, but James says that “the pragmatist theory of truth is a step of first-rate
importance in making radical empiricism prevail.”¹⁹ So it seems that James is not backtracking on his
methodological commitments. What then does James mean by first principles? As I see it, what James
means by a first principle is something unanalyzable or primitive. In the ontology of substance dualism, an
immaterial substance is a simple substance without extension or parts as opposed to a material substance
with extension and parts. And James does in fact say that consciousness is “the faint rumor left behind by
the disappearing ‘soul’ upon the air of philosophy,”²⁰ but what James says next is even more telling.
The development of James’s case against consciousness is not so much a polemic against substance
dualism as it is a critique of egological accounts of experience. Thus, James’s target is not so much Cartesian
substance dualism as it is the “neo-Kantian [view][…] that the experience is indefeasibly dualistic in
structure.”²¹ In this view, “object-plus-subject is the minimum that can actually be” given in experience.²²
This “subject-objection distinction […] is entirely different from that between mind and matter.”²³ It is a
claim about the structure of phenomenal experience. James’s point in “Does ‘Consciousness’ Exist?” is that
experience does not have this structure. Thus James, says, “my contention is exactly the reverse of this.
Experience […] has no such inner duplicity; and that separation of it into consciousness and content comes,
not by way of subtraction, but by way of addition.”²⁴ Here James’s point is that the truly unanalyzable or
primitive experience is the “instant field of the present […] the ‘pure’ experience.”²⁵ This field is “only
virtually or potentially either object or subject.”²⁶ In this sense, experience is not egological. There is no “I”
that knows some object “O.” Instead, “knowing can easily be explained as a particular sort of relation
towards one another into which portions of pure experience may enter.”²⁷ In this case, “knowing actually
and practically amounts to – leading towards, namely, and terminating-in percepts, through a series of
transitional experiences which the world supplies.”²⁸ Of course, this notion of “agreeable leading” is
exactly what it is at the core of James’s pragmatic theory of truth.²⁹ So radical empiricism is no substitute
doctrine for Jamesian pragmatism.
However, in “AWorld of Pure Experience,” James does say that radical empiricism “must neither admit
into its constructions any element that is not directly experienced, nor exclude from them any element that
is directly experienced.”³⁰ This may sound like the declaration of a methodological beginning point, and in
The Meaning of Truth, James does say that “[r]adical empiricism consists first of a postulate […] that the only
things that shall be debatable among philosophers shall be definable in terms drawn from experience.”³¹
What I want to suggest is that for James a postulate is not a voluntarist undertaking or promethean
conjuring, but a suggestion one is moved to by the general drift of experience. This would explain why
James says that “the pragmatist theory of truth is a step of first-rate importance in making radical empiri-
cism prevail,”³² and the fact that he makes this claim right before he states the postulate of the latter
doctrine. Of course, this raises the question of what additional work radical empiricism does over and above
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the work of pragmatism. Here I want to suggest radical empiricism is a transcendental account in support of
pragmatism in two ways: it explains how a practice facilitates knowing and how one practice can lead into
another.
Both pragmatism and radical empiricism have been interpreted as relativistic or problematically sub-
jectivist doctrines, but James thought of both as embracing what contemporary philosophers would now
call social epistemology. For example, in Pragmatism, after James says that truth means agreement of our
ideas with reality,³³ he says that “we exchange ideas” and that “we must talk consistently just as we must
think consistently.”³⁴ Thus, James says that “[t]rue ideas lead us into useful verbal and conceptual quarters
as well as directly up to useful sensible termini.”³⁵ And in “The Essence of Humanism,” James explicitly
says that his view is “essentially a social philosophy, a philosophy of ‘co’.”³⁶ Similarly, in “The Function of
Cognition,” James says that “[y]ou can deduce a possible sensation from your theory and taking me into
your laboratory, prove that your theory is true of my world by giving me the sensation then and there.”³⁷ Of
course, James has no scientistic biases; what holds in the case of scientific laboratories holds in the case of
other endeavors. As James says, “[t]he whole function of philosophy ought to be to find out what definite
difference it will make to you and me, at definite instants of our life, if this world-formula or that world-
formula be the true one.”³⁸ Thus, the Jamesian view is that we work out these differences in laboratories as
well as in churches and parliaments. In this sense, Jamesian pragmatism makes central use of the notion of
a practice, or an organized activity. However, Jamesian pragmatism with its central notion of worthwhile
leading does not enshrine an anti-individualistic knowing together, as some social epistemologies do.
Instead, Jamesian pragmatism emphasizes the experiences of both the individual and the collective and
the ways in which both individuals and groups form, disperse, and traverse various practices. In this sense,
Jamesian pragmatism recognizes a complex, fluid multiplicity of knowers of various scales as it specifies
what successful leading amounts to for both individuals and emerging and dissolving groups.³⁹
This understanding of Jamesian pragmatism combined with the notion of conceptually informed pure
experience finally leads us to the transcendental relationship between radical empiricism and pragmatism.
In The Meaning of Truth, James says that the “generalized conclusion [of radical empiricism] is that […] the
parts of experience hold together from next to next by relations that are themselves parts of experience.”⁴⁰
This conclusion accounts for the very possibility of the leading that is at the core of pragmatic truth, but
pragmatism also supports the traversing of practices. Here James appeals to the notion of “the more
substantive and the more transitive parts” of experience.⁴¹ Of course, James adds that these parts “run
into each other continuously,”⁴² but he is also clear that “[r]adical empiricism […] is fair to both the unity
and the disconnexion” in experience.⁴³ Thus, radical empiricism explains both how practices lead into one
another and break apart. However, the most important transcendental work radical empiricism plays with
respect to pragmatism is its account of how knowing together is possible within a particular practice. For
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James, this is accomplished by the radical empirical doctrine that two minds can know one thing,⁴⁴ or what
James calls the “conterminousness of different minds.”⁴⁵ This conterminousness is facilitated by the pure
experiential suggestion that consciousness does not fit the subject–object schema. In that schema, two
experiences of an object are necessarily distinct experiences.⁴⁶ In the case where one subject and another
subject both perceive a rope,⁴⁷ both persons experience something captured in the form “I see a rope”where
each I is necessarily distinct insofar as it refers to each separate person. In a conceptually informed pure
experience, however, both subjects experience something of the form “pullable rope.” This experience is, to
be sure, located in different streams of consciousness insofar as each person perceives the rope from
different angles, but the substantive component of the experience is the same insofar as each substantive
component of the experience possesses the same internal features and external transitive relations.⁴⁸ In this
way, then, radical empiricism explains both how the kind of knowing together pragmatism posits is
possible and how knowers of various scales both emerge and disperse through various conscious and
co-conscious processes.
3 W. E. B. Du Bois and ecclesial rationality in “Of the Faith of the
Fathers”
The Souls of Black Folk was published in 1903, 1 year after the publication of James’s The Varieties of
Religious Experience, and almost 2 years after James gave the first Gifford Lectures that became Varieties.
However, many of the essays that constitute Souls were written and published in various journals and
outlets and then revised upon inclusion in Souls. This was the case with the tenth chapter of Souls, “Of the
Faith of the Fathers,” which first appeared in the journal The New World: A Quarterly Review of Religious
Ethics and Theology in 1900 under the title “The Religion of the American Negro.” The relationship between
the philosophy of W. E. B. Du Bois and William James is complicated, and a chronology of the dynamical
influence the two had on each other and their respective philosophical developments is beyond the scope of
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this article.⁴⁹ However, it should be known that Du Bois was a student of James’s at Harvard,⁵⁰ and that he
himself once claimed to have become “a devoted follower of James at the time he was developing his
pragmatic philosophy.”⁵¹ In what follows, I do not want to suggest that Du Bois first formulates the
philosophy of pure experience in “Of the Faith of the Fathers,” but I do want to suggest that this chapter
can be interpreted as evincing a pragmatic recognition of a complex, fluid multiplicity of knowers of various
scales and a concrete example of the complex relationship that often exists between religious conscious-
ness and co-consciousness that is typical of individual participation in ecclesial bodies.⁵² I argue that this
case study serves as a fruitful exemplification of ecclesial rationality and irrationality when Jamesian
pragmatism is applied to it insofar as the chapter supports a pragmatic conception of successful participa-
tion in various practices.
“Of the Faith of the Fathers” begins with a journey, as Du Bois travels a country road “far frommy foster
home, on a dark Sunday night […] past wheat and corn, until we could hear dimly across the fields a
rhythmic cadence of song.”⁵³ The song is a “soft, thrilling, powerful [melody of][…] a Southern Negro
revival.”⁵⁴ The scene is somewhat startling to Du Bois who says he is used to the “quiet and subdued”
sermons of Berkshire.⁵⁵ At the scene, Du Bois reports an “air of intense existence that possessed that mass of
black folk.”⁵⁶ He claims that, “[a] sort of suppressed terror hung in the air and seemed to seize us, – a
pythian madness, a demoniac possession, that lent terrible reality to song and world.”⁵⁷ He describes the
“preacher [who] swayed and quivered […][as] people moaned and fluttered […][until] the gaunt-cheeked
brown woman beside [him] suddenly leaped straight into the air and shrieked like a lost soul, while round
about came wail and groan and outcry.”⁵⁸ Of the revival, Du Bois says that there are “[t]hree things
[characteristic of the] religion of the slave, – the Preacher, the Music, and the Frenzy.”⁵⁹ The Preacher,
Du Bois says, “is the most unique personality developed by the Negro on American soil.”⁶⁰ He is a “leader, a
politician, an orator, a ‘boss,’ and intriguer, an idealist […] and ever, too, the centre of a group of men.”⁶¹
“The Music […] is that plaintive rhythmic melody […] [s]prung from the African forests, where […] it was
adapted, changed, and intensified by the tragic soul-life of the slave, until, under the stress of law and
whip, it became the one true expression of a people’s sorrow, despair, and hope.”⁶² Finally, “the Frenzy or
‘Shouting,’ [is an expression of] the Spirit of the Lord pass[ing] by, and seizing the devotee, [making] him
mad with supernatural joy.”⁶³ This final feature of the revival, the Frenzy, Du Bois says, was “the one more
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devoutly believed in than all the rest.”⁶⁴ In fact, Du Bois says the Frenzy held “so firm a hold […] on the
Negro, that many generations firmly believed that without this visible manifestation of the God there could
be no true communion with the Invisible.”⁶⁵
With this brief description of the Southern revival, Du Bois already invokes the fluid multiplicity of a
complex of knowers of various scales characteristic of a practice understood pragmatically. First, Du Bois
describes himself on a journey, not in isolation of course, but in the environment of the country road.
However, as he comes upon the revival, he notes “the air of intense excitement […][and] suppressed terror
[…][that] seemed to seize us.”⁶⁶ Here Du Bois notes his incorporation into an emergent co-consciousness
that relates the disparate actors.⁶⁷ However, the group is not described as a homogenous mass. Instead, Du
Bois notes the “black and massive form of the preacher” who stands over and against the rest of the crowd
“as the words crowded to his lips and flew at [them] in singular eloquence.”⁶⁸ In this way, Du Bois
recognizes the fluidity of the emergent group, as the preacher is first included in “that mass of black
folk”⁶⁹ and then singled out against the rest of the crowd. This pattern repeats as “[t]he people moaned
and fluttered” at the preacher’s words until “the gaunt-cheeked brown woman beside [Du Bois] suddenly
leaped straight into the air and shrieked like a lost soul.”⁷⁰ This description of the woman as “a lost soul”
draws attention to the sense in which the woman has broken out of the co-consciousness of the group. Du
Bois’s use of the term “Frenzy” to describe the behavior of the group in the revival also reinforces the sense
in which the many become a multiplicity in virtue of a shared experience, just as James describes with his
philosophy of pure experience. This is described as a “‘Shouting,’ when the Spirit of the Lord” seizes the
emergent group and they share a co-consciousness of “supernatural joy.”⁷¹
Of course, from here Du Bois launches into a genealogical account of “Negro religion as a development
[…] from the heathenism of the Gold Coast to the institutional Negro church of Chicago.”⁷² While this shift to
genealogy is interesting itself,⁷³ and can be read as a movement from one practice to another within the
chapter, Du Bois also continues his account of the place of the church in everyday life, claiming that the
“Negro church […] is the social centre of Negro life […][and] the central club-house of a community of a
thousand or more.”⁷⁴ At these churches, several activities are performed: “[c]onsiderable sums of money
are collected […] employment is found for the idle, strangers are introduced, news is disseminated, and
charity [is] distributed.”⁷⁵ Thus, Du Bois says, “[t]he activity of a church like this is immense and far-
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is also “the expression of the inner ethical life of a people.”⁷⁷ As Du Bois notes, “the Church often stands as a
real conserver of morals, a strengthener of family life, and the final authority on what is Good and Right.”⁷⁸
In this description of the church as both a governing group of persons and a built location at the
intersection of various activities, Du Bois implicitly recognizes the pragmatic commitment to the way
individuals and groups traverse various practices. As an institution, the church body engages in various
internal religious practices, as Du Bois notes when he says, “Depravity, Sin, Redemption, Heaven, Hell, and
Damnation are preached twice a Sunday with much fervor.”⁷⁹ But the church also facilitates participation in
external practices, as in the case of finding employment for its members, and it partakes in nonreligious
practices, as in the case of disseminating news. These practices sometimes engage various groups of
people: “insurance societies, women’s societies, secret societies, and mass meetings of various kinds.”⁸⁰
Sometimes they engage various individuals and smaller groups of persons, as Du Bois notes when he adds
that “[e]ntertainments, suppers, and lectures are held beside the five or six regular weekly religious services
[…][and that back] of this more formal religion, the Church often stands as a real conservers of morals [and]
strengthener of family life.”⁸¹
Of course, the traversing of these various practices must meet various conditions as exemplified by
James’s demand for “linking things satisfactorily.”⁸² For James, this “[s]atisfactoriness has to be measured
by a multitude of standards.”⁸³ These are “satisfactions (in the plural).”⁸⁴ They include intellectual, moral,
aesthetical, and practical dimensions, and James says that they must be satisfied simultaneously.⁸⁵ The
genealogical account of “the large development of the Negro church since Emancipation”⁸⁶ that Du Bois
pivots to after his description of the church’s various functions may seem to shift the subject from the
ecclesial body’s satisfactory linking of various practices to a sociohistorical analysis, but this account
quickly leads to “two great and hardly reconcilable streams of thought and ethical strivings”⁸⁷ Du Bois
warns against. This reference to “streams of thought” is a clear allusion to James and Du Bois’s critique of
“the two great and hardly reconcilable streams” is an indication that he has not entirely dropped the theme
of satisfactory leading. Thus, Du Bois says that “[b]etween [these] two extreme types of ethical attitude […]
wavers the mass of the millions of Negroes […] and their religious life and activity”⁸⁸ which exemplify an
ecclesial rationality to be contrasted with the irrationality expressed by the extreme types. In this way, Du
Bois’s genealogical analysis can be read as both a sociohistorical account of the development of the black
church and an account of how ecclesial practices can link successfully and unsuccessfully to the organized
activities of their greater context.
To see this, it will help to carefully consider the direction Du Bois describes the development of the
black church taking. He starts by noting that “the social history of the Negro did not start in America…[but
that he] was brought from a definite social environment […][where his] religion was nature-worship.”⁸⁹
“The first rude change in this life was the slave ship and the West Indian sugar-fields [as the] plantation
organization replaced the clan and tribe.”⁹⁰ Here “the Priest or Medicine-man […] of the former group life







82 James, Pragmatism, 34.
83 James, Essays, 128.
84 James, The Meaning, 104/270.
85 James, A Pluralistic, 55.






Ecclesial Belonging in a World of Pure Experience  119
institution “was not […] by any means Christian nor definitely organized […][but] an adaptation and
mingling of heathen rites.”⁹² Only by “[a]ssociation with the masters [and] missionary efforts […][did]
these rites [take on] an early veneer of Christianity, [until] after the lapse of many generations the Negro
church became Christian.”⁹³ In this beginning, “the church was confined to the plantation, and [thus]
consisted of a series of disconnected units.”⁹⁴ After Emancipation, “the Negro church largely severed […]
affiliations […] they […] had with […] white churches, either by choice or by compulsion.”⁹⁵ At this time,
“[t]he Baptist churches became independent, [and] the Methodists were compelled […] to unite for pur-
poses of episcopal government.”⁹⁶
Before Emancipation, however, “the doctrines of passive submission embodied in the newly learned
Christianity […][inculcated a] deep religious fatalism” when combined with the socioeconomic position as
slave.⁹⁷ Here, “the spirit of revolt gradually died away […][until] courtesy became humility, [and] moral
strength degenerated into submission.”⁹⁸ Thus, Du Bois says that, “[u]nder the lax moral life of the
plantation […] a religion of resignation and submission degenerated […] into a philosophy of indulgence
and crime.”⁹⁹However, at this time “the gradual growth of a class of free Negroes [caused] a change.”¹⁰⁰ For
these persons, “[f]reedom became […] a real thing and not a dream.” As a result, their “religion became
darker and more intense […][and the] ‘Coming of the Lord’ swept this side of Death, and came to be a thing
to be hoped for in this day.”¹⁰¹ In this way, “Negro religion […] transformed itself and identified itself with
the dream of Abolition, until that which was a radical fad in the white North and an anarchistic plot in the
white South had become a religion to the black world.”¹⁰²
With this description of the development of the church, Du Bois draws a clear contrast not only between
two religious’ temperaments but also between two forms of ecclesial belonging.¹⁰³ On the one hand, there is
the religious temperament of pessimistic fatalism. On the other hand, there is a more optimistic religious
temperament. The first temperament contributes to a form of ecclesial belonging that makes no contact with
the outside world and cultivates “sullen hopelessness [rather than] hopeful strife.”¹⁰⁴ The second tempera-
ment contributes to a form of ecclesial belonging that engages “fugitive slaves and irrepressible discussion
[with a] desire for freedom.”¹⁰⁵ The first temperament and form of ecclesial belonging is a form of irration-
ality insofar as it neglects the ethical and practical dimensions of rationality. The second temperament and
form of ecclesial belonging is an improvement insofar as it partly embraces the ethical dimensions.
However, Du Bois stops short of claiming that this second outlook is entirely rational. He says that
“when Emancipation finally came […] the freedman […] stood dumb and motionless before the whirlwind
[asking]what had he to do with it? Was it not the Lord’s doing?”¹⁰⁶With this impression, “he stood awaiting
new wonders till the inevitable Age of Reaction swept over the nation and brought the crisis of to-day.”¹⁰⁷ In
this sense, the second improved temperament still amounts to a failure of rationality insofar as it overlooks
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reverberates into a corruption of sociopolitical engagement further undermining the practical dimension
of rationality. Here the potential meliorism of the abolition movement is undermined by empirical
inadequacy.
The result of this melioristic vitiation is the danger of the two extreme types of thinking Du
Bois describes as the potential traps for contemporary ecclesial bodies and their members. Though
Emancipation has brought abolition to the masses of people, “the reactionary forces of prejudice, greed
and revenge” force the freed people into unenviable socioeconomic and political positions. Against these
forces, two further temperaments emerge: one “bitter and vindictive,” the other “shrewder and keener and
more tortuous.”¹⁰⁸ According to Du Bois, “the danger of the [first] lies in anarchy, that of the other in
hypocrisy.”¹⁰⁹ The first type “stands almost ready to curse God and die, [while] the other is too often found a
traitor to right and a coward before force.”¹¹⁰ The vindictive anarchist “is wedded to ideals remote, whim-
sical, perhaps impossible of realization.” The hypocrite, on the other hand, “forgets that life is more than
meat and the body more than raiment.”¹¹¹ As ecclesial bodies, “the two groups […] represent […] divergent
ethical tendencies, the first […] toward radicalism, the other toward hypocritical compromise.”¹¹²
Here again Du Bois paints two portraits of ecclesial irrationality. The radicalism of the anarchists is
marked by a failure of practicality and a vengeance that besmirches ethical engagement. The tortuousness
of the hypocrites is marked by a failure of the ethical demeanor and intellectual incoherence. For the
hypocrite, this is the result of a narrow conception of practicality construed as a mere material getting
by, as Du Bois notes when he says that this type of mind “sees in the very strength of the anti-Negro
movement its patent weaknesses, and […] endeavor[s] to turn this weakness to the black man’s strength.”¹¹³
In this way, then, both groups fail to exhibit appropriate ecclesial rationality insofar as both groups fail to
link their ecclesial practices satisfactorily with the practices of their broader sociopolitical context.¹¹⁴ For
the anarchists, this amounts to a failure to link their sermons, hymnals, and liturgies to the practices of
discourse and democracy that characterize broader sociopolitical life. For the hypocrites, this amounts to a
failure to link their sermons, hymnals, and liturgies to the practices of civic engagement that characterize
the sociopolitical fight for equality. In both cases, this ecclesial irrationality is also marked by an empirical
inadequacy, or a failure to understand the history, politics, theology, economics and psychology of con-
temporary life and its corresponding crisis.
Between and against these groups, however, Du Bois paints a portrait of ecclesial rationality that he
suggests is more characteristic of “the mass of the millions of Negroes.”¹¹⁵ These ecclesial bodies are marked
by a “religious life and activity [that] partake[s] of [the contemporary] social conflict within their ranks.”¹¹⁶
These institutions “[cater] to the desire for information and amusement of their members.”¹¹⁷ Of course,
they are not entirely perfect. They “warily [avoid] unpleasant questions both within and without the black
world.”¹¹⁸ But they redeem themselves insofar as they “[preach] in effect if not in word: Dum vivimus,
vivamus.”¹¹⁹ In this way, they give some expression to “the deep religious feeling of the real Negro heart
[…] seeking in the great night a new religious ideal.”¹²⁰ Thus, they reach “toward the Goal, out of the Valley
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White People Only.’”¹²¹ With this description, Du Bois suggests that these ecclesial bodies are most rational
when they express appropriate ethical striving and broader practical engagement. Their expression of “the
deep religious feeling of the real Negro heart” also suggests an aesthetical adequacy and an attentiveness to
spiritual reality as well an understanding of the reality of contemporary life and crisis that the extreme types
miss. In this way, then, Du Bois constructs a conception of ecclesial rationality that coheres with James’s
pragmatism and the transcendental radical empiricist phenomenology that supports it.
4 Ecclesial (ir)rationality and the COVID-19 pandemic
The preceding account of Du Bois’s “Of the Faith of the Fathers” suggests several forms of ecclesial
irrationality that can be observed during the COVID-19 pandemic. In my view, Du Bois identifies three
primary forms of ecclesial irrationality that he contrasts with one form of ecclesial rationality described at
the end of the chapter. This is not to say that this typology exhausts the possible forms of ecclesial (ir)
rationality, but that it makes helpful sense of the problematic forms of ecclesial belonging Du Bois identifies
in “Of the Faith of the Fathers” as well as the problematic forms of ecclesial response to the COVID-19
pandemic.
The suggestion that Du Bois identifies three primary forms of ecclesial irrationality in “Of the Faith of
the Fathers” may seem surprising, given Du Bois’s reference to “two great and hardly reconcilable streams
of thought.”¹²² However, these two streams of thought are developments of the two religious temperaments
that characterized some forms of black religious life during the struggle toward Emancipation, while the
“hardly reconcilable streams of thought” are operant during the Reconstruction period Du Bois is arguably
most concerned with in the chapter. Why not suggest then that Du Bois identifies four forms of ecclesial
irrationality? The reason is that the two earlier religious temperaments Du Bois criticizes are both forms of
what Du Bois describes as “deep religious fatalism.”¹²³ The difference between the two temperaments is a
difference in outlook. The first is more pessimistic and involves “sullen hopelessness”¹²⁴while the second is
more optimistic and involves “waiting for new wonders.”¹²⁵ The second optimistic temperament is tinged
with resistance to the conditions of slavery and inequality, but its fatalism is sealed with what Du Bois
describes as “a note of revenge” and a hope for the “Coming of the Lord” and Judgment Day.¹²⁶
The “two great and hardly reconcilable streams of thought” are not forms of fatalism. The first Du Bois
describes as anarchist. The second Du Bois describes as hypocritical. The anarchists can appear like fatal-
ists. Du Bois suggests that the anarchist “stands almost ready to curse God and die.”¹²⁷ However, Du Bois
describes the anarchist as problematically “tending toward radicalism.”¹²⁸ The anarchist is “wedded to
ideals remote,”¹²⁹ and thus generally uncooperative, but the problem is not that the anarchist possesses the
fatalist’s feeling of impotence. Du Bois does say that the anarchists are “[c]onscious of […] impotence,” but
their radicalism suggests a more energetic temperament than that of the fatalists.¹³⁰ The hypocrites, on the
other hand, are far from fatalists. They are “too often found a traitor to right and a coward before force.”¹³¹
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compromise.¹³² They recognize the effectiveness of their actions, but they accept far too little in the way of
rights and improvements in quality of life. Thus, Du Bois says that the hypocrite “forgets that life is more
than meat and the body is more than raiment.”¹³³
Although these problematic temperaments accurately describe various forms of individual irrationality,
Du Bois also recognizes the way these forms of irrationality reappear in ecclesial bodies. For instance, Du
Bois notes how the sociopolitical circumstances foster these temperaments and present a dilemma that is
“tingeing and changing […] religious life.”¹³⁴ In the case of the anarchists, this results in a religion that
“often becomes bitter and vindictive […] a wail rather than a hope, a sneer rather than a faith.”¹³⁵ In the case
of the hypocrite, this results in a religion that operates under the shadow of “the anti-Negro movement.”¹³⁶
Thus, Du Bois concludes that while the majority of people waver between these two tendencies, “[t]heir
churches are differentiating, – now into groups of cold, fashionable devotees, in no way distinguishable
from similar white groups save in color of skin; now into large and social business institutions.”¹³⁷ These
forms of organization are not so much anarchist or hypocritical, but they evince tendencies toward one or
the other: sometimes toward the eschatological disengagement of the anarchists and sometimes toward the
hasty compromise of the hypocrites.
If that’s right, then Du Bois does in fact identify three primary forms of ecclesial irrationality. Du Bois
describes these individuals as fatalists, anarchists, and hypocrites, but how should one characterize their
corresponding ecclesial types? To distinguish the ecclesial from individual types of irrationality, I propose
the following descriptions: Resignationism, Utopianism, and Amoralism. Applying Jamesian pragmatism to
each type, we can describe each as a failure to satisfactorily link ecclesial and nonecclesial practices. Of
course, if these are going to count as distinct forms of ecclesial irrationality, then each type will have to fail
in distinctive ways. In the case of Resignationism, I want to suggest that there is a general failure to link
liturgical and nonliturgical ecclesial practices to outside practices. Ecclesial bodies of this type do not
collectively conceive of the church as having any other purpose than to support the participation of
individuals and various groups of people, such as families, in worship practices that contribute to spiritual
endurance of circumstances. In the case of Utopianism, there is not a general failure to link liturgical and
nonliturgical practices to outside practices. Instead, liturgical and other practices are collectively conceived
as primarily existing for the purpose of releasing the pressure of life outside the ecclesial body and
supporting worship practices that contribute to spiritual preparation for eschatological life. Finally, in
the case of Amoralism, there is an expressed intention of linking liturgical and nonliturgical practices to
outside practices. However, liturgical practices are collectively conceived as primarily existing for the
purpose of easing the movement of groups and individuals to and from the ecclesial body and supporting
worship practices that facilitate participation in a real or perceived broader sociopolitical status quo.
The distinctiveness of each type of ecclesial irrationality can be strengthened and brought into clearer
view by applying Jamesian pragmatism to each type. Recall that Jamesian pragmatism requires the con-
sistent and simultaneous satisfaction of a plurality of desiderata as groups and individuals move from one
practice to another and that this plurality includes intellectual, ethical, aesthetical, and practical dimen-
sions. On almost every one of these counts, Resignationism fails. Resignationist churches not only often fail
to adequately understand the facts of their circumstances, but they deliberately eschew efforts to inspire
and to improve conditions and participate in the broader sociopolitical context. They thereby fail to satisfy
aesthetical, ethical, and practical dimensions of rationality. Utopianism fares better, but while Utopian
churches may better understand the facts of their circumstances and inspire their members, they over-
emphasize ethical ideals and thus promote deficient sociopolitical cooperation, thereby failing to satisfy the
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while Amoral churches are practically oriented, their emphasis on immediate and easy results often sacri-
fices ethical engagement and thereby promotes little more than a perceived status quo.
Of course, each of these forms of ecclesial irrationality is an ideal type. No church or ecclesial body will
always embody these forms, and many may express tendencies toward more than one. Therefore, assess-
ments of ecclesial irrationality in the COVID-19 pandemic should not be expected to produce examples of
ecclesial bodies that perfectly conform to any one particular type. A demonstration that various ecclesial
responses to the COVID-19 pandemic exhibit tendencies toward one or more these forms of ecclesial
irrationality is sufficient to establish the fruitfulness of the typology.
In response to the government- and medical-issued stay-at-home orders, mask mandates, and/or
instructions not to hold mass gatherings, some churches responded by shirking all or most of these orders.
Jamesian pragmatism suggests that these responses are irrational. These ecclesial responses not only fail to
establish an adequate dialogue with the scientific and medical community, they also fail to inspire, to take
adequate account of the well-being of others, and to take actions that facilitate the construction of a
postpandemic world. In this way, these responses fail to satisfy each of the dimensions of rationality by
failing to satisfactorily link ecclesial practices to the practices of broader contemporary life, but this alone is
not sufficient to identify what form of irrationality each of these ecclesial bodies is expressing. To identify
these forms, it is necessary to examine what ecclesial leaders have said about their responses.
In some cases, noncompliant ecclesial bodies have appealed to “rationales” that express fatalist out-
looks. For example, in Bakersfield, CA, pastor Angelo Frazier of RiverLakes Community Church has been
holding church gatherings outside but expressed interest in returning indoors. “I think people are deciding
to do what is God-given to them,” Frazier said. “They are going to do what they need to do, and the
consequences will be what they are.”¹³⁸ Similarly, in Decatur, IL, pastor Derek Bradshaw held services
that defy state orders prohibiting gatherings of more than ten persons. In defense of his church’s decision,
Bradshaw suggests that mortal lives have a “zero percent” survival rate, and that spiritual death can only be
prevented by accepting the eternal cure made possible by Christ.¹³⁹ In Montreal, Canada, pastor Stefano
Gesualdi has been considering holding services for a number of congregants that defy state orders while
staging protests against the orders. Gesualdi is unconcerned with the consequences of the behaviors.
Speaking on behalf of the protesters, Gesualdi said, “Let us choose for ourselves. And if it costs me my
life? Great. Because if I die, and I know that I died obeying the Lord, it was worth it.”¹⁴⁰ In each of these
cases, these pastors express little concern for what will occur, acknowledge little to no role that their
ecclesial behaviors will have in the production of what will occur, and seem to regard the purpose of
worship as primarily concerned with spiritual endurance of the present circumstances and little more
than that. In this way, these pastors and the ecclesial bodies they represent exhibit signs of Resignationism.
In other cases, noncompliant ecclesial bodies have appealed to “rationales” that express overwhelming
desire to return to prepandemic normal and little signs of concern for public health and the well-being of
others. For example, in Akron, OH, Reverend Randy Baker held outdoor services in the early days of the
pandemic and expressed no intention of closing the church. “Look around this group, man,” Rev. Baker
said. “This is the cream of the crop right here. Good to be in God’s house today […] This is God’s house.
Randy Baker cannot, will not, no matter what the cause, lock those doors on Sunday morning.”¹⁴¹ Similarly,
in Fair Oaks, CA, Grace Bible Church circulated a letter in fall 2020 calling church assembly an “essential
duty” and arguing that “the spiritual health of the Body of Christ is greater priority than the concerns over
the health of the physical body.”¹⁴² In Louisiana, a Oneness Pentecostal pastor who defied the state ban on
large gatherings said, “We hold our religious rights dear, and we are going to assemble no matter what
someone says.”¹⁴³ And in Rocklin, CA, Destiny Church held a service defying state prohibition on large
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gatherings to host popular speaker Charlie Kirk who tweeted, “It is time to disobey ALL orders that violate
our natural rights. No more curfews, lockdowns, or authoritarian measures. Disobey, resist, defy – open
America!”¹⁴⁴ In each of these cases, these ecclesial leaders and bodies express little to no concern for how
the exercise of their “rights” impacts others and the general public’s health and appear to regard the
purpose of worship as primarily concerned with getting parishioners to church and maintaining what
they perceive as the sociopolitical status quo. In this way, these ecclesial bodies exhibit signs of Amoralism.
Of course, in some of these cases, one could argue that these ecclesial bodies exhibit both signs of
Resignationism and Amoralism. The important point to note is that the forms of ecclesial irrationality
Du Bois identified over a century ago help identify what is problematic and irrational about the ecclesial
responses to the contemporary COVID pandemic. In fact, the COVID pandemic has brought out the fact that
various ecclesial bodies fail to recognize the epistemic value of ecclesial belonging. Rather than acknowl-
edge the social participatory character of religious practices and the importance of ecclesial belonging as an
opportunity to partake in collective decision-making and discernment, many COVID guideline-defiant
ecclesial bodies seem to regard ecclesial bodies as a place where members come to express their individual
preferences. For example, in Coeur D’Alene, ID, Candlelight Christian Fellowship’s Senior Pastor, Paul Van
Noy, described the church’s mask-wearing policy as “if you feel comfortable wearing a mask you can. If
you’re not comfortable wearing a mask you don’t have to. Nobody is going to be criticized for whatever
decision they make.”¹⁴⁵ Similarly, Brooks Pentecostal Church in Maine held a 100- to 150-person gathering
in October where masks were available, but not required. The Maine Center for Disease Concern later linked
the gathering to 62 cases of COVID contraction.¹⁴⁶ In both cases, these churches appear not to regard
membership as a commitment to any kind of collective decision-making process but merely as a place
where individuals meet and make their own decisions. While the evidence cited above does not establish
this much in the cases presented above, it is not hard to imagine that many of these COVID guideline-
defiant churches share this view of ecclesial belonging.
How then can one characterize ecclesial rationality and rational ecclesial belonging? Any ecclesial
body that successfully links liturgical and other ecclesial practices to the broader practices of the commu-
nity as defined by Jamesian pragmatism will count as rational and any form of ecclesial belonging that
recognizes the social participatory character of religious practices and can satisfy the demands of Jamesian
pragmatismwill equally count as rational. To count as rational, the ecclesial body will likely need to adopt a
collective conception of the church as embracing a plurality of purposes. Some of these purposes might
include various forms of spiritual edification, the supporting of various worship practices, and engagement
in external activities that facilitate the collaborative construction of a world where collective and individual
flourishing is made more and more possible.¹⁴⁷ In such churches, ecclesial bodies will not be regarded as
places where individuals choose to come to bring their personal decisions before God, but as places where a
multiplicity of actors gather to participate in collective decision-making processes. However, it’s important
to remember that rational ecclesial bodies will not only engage their full membership in such processes but
proactively dialogue with elected officials, health officials, and other pertinent authorities on matters
relevant to each decision.
In most cases of pandemic guideline defiance, there is little reason to suspect that ecclesial leaders
reached out to relevant officials to establish these dialogues. In some cases, ecclesial leaders have even
been documented refusing assistance from outside organizations. For example, in Charlotte, NC, the United
House of Prayer for All People held a mass gathering from October 4 to October 11 that became a super
spreader event infecting at least 82 people. The church refused a nonprofit organization’s offer to provide
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free testing for the event.¹⁴⁸ In this sense, the majority of COVID guideline-defiant ecclesial bodies are also
guilty of a social epistemological isolationism. So, to three forms of ecclesial irrationality identified by Du
Bois, we might also add a fourth form: Dogmatism. In the case of any form of Dogmatism, there is a failure
on behalf of ecclesial bodies to link their internal decision-making practices with the decision-making
practices of the broader epistemic community. In these churches, liturgical and other ecclesial practices
are conceived as primarily existing for the purpose of introducing parishioners to a supreme body of
knowledge and supporting worship practices that prepare individuals to subordinate all other forms of
knowledge to this supreme body and to jettison any commitment that cannot be easily assimilated and/or
subordinated. In this sense, each of the other three forms of ecclesial irrationality can be identified as a form
of Dogmatism. However, an ecclesial body could be theoretically guilty of a more intellectual isolationism
without exhibiting one or more of the other three forms. In any case, the philosophical work of William
James and W. E. B. Du Bois helps identify what is irrational about the behavior of these ecclesial bodies and
their members.
5 Conclusion
I argued that radical empiricism is a non-egological transcendental phenomenology in support of Jamesian
pragmatism and that one primary function of the doctrine of pure experience is to explain how two minds
can share knowledge and understanding in the context of a practice or organized activity. I suggested that
this account coheres with W. E. B. Du Bois’s “Of the Faith of the Fathers” and that an explication of this
assemblage of positions helps articulate a view of ecclesial rationality that pervades the chapter. In this
view, ecclesial rationality involves the successful leading of individuals and groups through various
internal ecclesial practices to successful engagement in external practices and back to the ecclesial
body. Successful leading is defined by the consistent and simultaneous satisfaction of a plurality of desi-
derata, and irrationality is thus interpreted as failure of this leading in or between practices. This view
suggests that ecclesial rationality is characterized by an appropriate responsiveness to institutions outside
of the ecclesial body and by its capacity to facilitate its members’ participation in the broader ecclesial
context. Applied to the case of the COVID-19 global pandemic, this view suggests that what is irrational
about various religious reactions, such as the shunning of stay-at-home orders and/or mask mandates, is
the severance of internal ecclesial practices from external practices. This further suggests that what is
irrational about these religious reactions to the pandemic is not a failure to adhere to some alien standard
of rationality but a failure to grasp and embrace the standards of ecclesial rationality.
This view of religious irrationality in the COVID-19 pandemic raises the possibility that the pandemic
has been exacerbated by alien conceptions of rationality that atomize knowers, divorce intellectual, ethical,
and practical commitments, and cultivate a systematic distrust of experience, tradition, and authority.
Because this constellation of tendencies is often expressed in the value-neutral skepticism of secular
understandings of rationality, it is possible that secular rationality has contributed to the COVID-19 pan-
demic and that the value-laden trust-based rationality of religious belonging is needed to both heal the
global population and prevent future outbreaks. This contention may seem counterintuitive, given the way
contemporary political discourse frames religion and the apparent trust many religious persons place in the
ecclesial leaders of the guideline-defiant churches cited above, but the preceding analysis reveals how
partial this trust is and how easily one experience and/or one authority can be enshrined over another. It is
in this sense that a distinctively religious conception of rationality that emphasizes trust in experience,
tradition, and authority may have been eroded and may have contributed to the severity of the COVID-19
pandemic in its erosion.
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Further genealogical and genetic phenomenological work is needed to investigate these possibilities,
but the preceding lends some support to this case. Further work is also needed to reinforce the conception
of ecclesial rationality articulated in the preceding, to apply this understanding to other concrete cases, and
to corroborate the suggestion that the James–Du Bois view of rationality is as much capable of addressing
the contemporary crises we face in this century as it was capable of addressing the crises faced at the turn of
the twentieth century. Perhaps it is time to embrace the vision of the future articulated in the recent
philosophical past. Perhaps it is high time to revisit an old philosophical declaration, this time addressed
to that growing body of persons who identify as spiritual, but not religious, and declare: Believers of the
world unite! You have nothing to lose but your chains!
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